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NOTES
HABEAS CoRPus AND ACTUAL INNOCENCE OF THE
DEATH SENTENCE AFTER SAWYER V WHITLEY:
ANOTHER NAIL INTO THE COFFIN OF STATE
CAPrrAL DEFENDANTS
INTRODUCTION
For over a century,' the federal writ of habeas corpus has
provided the most important means2 by which state prisoners could
challenge, through collateral attack,3 the constitutionality of either
their conviction or their sentence.4 While the writ prevents state
1. In 1867, federal habeas corpus relief became available to "any person restrained of
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution [sic]." YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1517 (1990) (citing the current version of the 1867 Act which is
found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1988)). Prior to that time, the remedy was limited to
persons held in custody by the federal government. Id. at 1517. For a different perspec-
five on the evolution of the federal writ of habeas corpus, see OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON FEDERAL HABEAS COR-
PUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS V-Vi (1988) [hereinafter REPORT] (stressing the distinc-
tion between the "constitutional" and the "statutory" writs of habeas corpus).
2. Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Propos-
als, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). The right is guaranteed by the Constitution and was
extended to the states by Congress after the civil war. Id.
3. DONALD E. WILKES. JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND
RELIEF § 1-4 (1983). A conviction or sentence imposed by a state court may be "direct-
ly" or "collaterally" attacked with a goal of granting, respectively, a direct or collateral
remedy. Id. Direct remedies include both "trial remedies," which are available within the
convicting court itself, and "appellate remedies," which are available within the appellate
court upon direct review of the trial proceedings. ld. Generally, a conviction or a sentence
can be open to direct attack, and thus eligible for direct relief, if the conviction or sen-
tence results from the commission of a nonharmless legal error. Id. Collateral (or
postconviction) remedies, however, are not available until the direct remedy proceedings
have been completed and usually are available only where there has been egregious, e.g.
constitutional, error. Id. 1-5. While there are different types of collateral remedies, this
note will focus on federal habeas corpus.
4. Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 4; see also REPORT, supra note 1, at * (noting
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courts .from violating the established constitutional rights of all
prisoners, it is particularly necessary to safeguard the interests of
capital defendants.5 Specifically, habeas corpus is designed to act
as a "safety valve"6 for capital defendants who allege that they are
either innocent of the crime charged7 or innocent of the sentence
received.8 In other words, "innocence," within the capital context,
can encompass more than mere factual innocence of the crime; it
can include defendants who are "innocent" in terms of the sentence
or who do not deserve to die.9 Therefore, claims of innocence in
habeas corpus apply to both the defendant who has not committed
the crime charged and the defendant who has been inappropriately
sentenced to death.'0
The use of the writ of habeas corpus, however, has been a
source of continuing controversy" and within the past decade has
culminated in the radical transformation, and weakening, of the
once Great Writ. 2 This controversy revolves around two key is-
sues: (1) the number of habeas petitions that a state prisoner may
that "a state prisoner who has exhausted his avenues of appeal in the state court system
may continue to litigate the validity of his conviction or sentence by applying for habeas
corpus in a federal district court").
5. See Bruce S. Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 REV.
OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 415, 415 (1990-91).
6. Id.
7. But see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860-61 (1993) (holding that newly dis-
covered evidence which shows the petitioner did not commit capital murder was not a
ground for habeas corpus relief); see also New Evidence is Not Enough, High Court
Rules, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 26, 1993, at 7A (asserting that after Herrera,
"inmates convicted in state courts almost always are barred from contesting guilt in feder-
al habeas corpus proceedings"). By contrast, this note examines the propriety of sentences
on federal habeas corpus.
8. Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 415-16.
9. See Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamental
Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence. 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 379, 423 (1988) (noting
that "[tihe prisoner who argues innocence at sentencing is a murderer. But he does
not deserve to die").
10. Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 415-16 (stating that habeas corpus "provides the oppor-
tunity for the defendant who is either innocent of the crime charged or of the sentence
received, to obtain relief").
11. IRA P ROBNs, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN
STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 42 (1990) (noting that the controversy involves the states'
interest in "preserving domestic order versus the preeminence of the federal government in
[protecting] national interests").
12. Ledewitz, supra note 5, at, 415 (noting "a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions has restricted access by state prisoners to the Great Writ"); see also REPORT,
supra note 1, at i (arguing that "the contemporary [statutory] 'writ of habeas corpus'
is not the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law").
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raise;' 3 and (2) the timing or promptness of those petitions. 4 The
current battle over these issues echoes the 200-year-old debate be-
tween proponents of individual constitutional rights and advocates
of state sovereignty " However, the balance of power between
these two poles of thought now has tipped in favor of state sover-
eignty as the Rehnquist Court has twisted this once straightforward
constitutional remedy into a morass of procedural barriers which
state prisoners must overcome to have procedurally defaulted'6 or
repeated'7 petitions entertained before a federal court.' Notably,
these procedural hurdles are even more problematic for capital de-
fendants who are likely to be burdened with sub-standard counsel
throughout the judicial process.' Despite this burden, if a capital
13. See, e.g, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., concumng) (com-
plaining that modem federal habeas corpus has resulted in "floods of stale, frivolous and
repetitive petitions [which] inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own");
see also REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-38 (commenting that by 1987, the federal system
was overwhelmed with over 9,500 habeas applications, many of which were repetitive or
delayed). Accordingly, "federal habeas corpus jurisdiction provides an avenue for obstruc-
tion and delay [that] states are powerless to address." Id. at 37. But see Donald P.
Lay, Modem Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas: The Rights of Prisoners Pre-
served, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 710 (1972) ("We would not send two astronauts to the
moon without providing them with at least three or four back-up systems. Should we
send [scores of persons] to prison with even less reserves?").
14. Lay, supra note 13, at 707-08 (asserting that "[n]othing in the traditions of habeas
corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain
collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay") (citation omitted).
15. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (outlining these competing argu-
ments); see also ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing 200-year-old state and federal
conflicts concerning constitutional law and criminal defendants).
16. See infra note 29 (defining procedurally defaulted petitions).
17. See infra note 30 (providing two examples of repeated petitions).
18. Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 5.
In recent years, the court [sic] has made no secret of its hostility to state pns-
oners asking federal courts to review their convictions on "writs of habeas
corpus." The current court [sic] has focused on the "heavy burden" it places on
"scarce judicial resources" and on the states' interest in finality of criminal
proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has created a maze of rules to limit the
availability of the writ.
Jordan Steiker, Can They Execute the Innocent? Probably, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 11, 1992, at
A23.
19. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (surveying the lack of requirements
for appointment as counsel in capital cases and the lack of adequate compensation for
capital case defense attorneys). See generally ROBBINS, note 11, at 49-76 (providing de-
tailed analysis of the problems associated with representation of capital defendants). The
review of petitions that are delayed or incomplete because of the errors of counsel may
be further hindered because there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in habeas
cases, since there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in collateral proceedings. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 1II S. Ct. 2546, 2568 (1991) (barnng the habeas claim of a
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defendant fails to abide by every procedural rule, the merits of his
constitutional claim cannot be heard by a federal court absent
extraordinary justification.2"
A federal court may review violations of federal law alleged
in petitions which do not comply with state, and now federal,2'
procedural rules under two circumstances.22 Noncompliance may
be excused only if (1) the petitioner shows cause and prejudice;'
or if (2) the petitioner is a victim of a fundamental miscarriage of
justice,24 because he is either actually innocent' of the crime
charged or of the sentence received.26 While the boundaries of
cause and prejudice have been examined extensively,27 the bound-
aries of actual innocence have not and remain somewhat ambigu-
ous.
28
This Note will explore the narrow confines of both actual
innocence and the fundamental miscamage of justice exception for
federal review of procedurally defaulted29 or repeated30 habeas
capital defendant because his lawyer filed a notice of appeal of the state postconviction
decision three days late).
20. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 380 (discussing a miscarriage of justice as the only
reason, other than cause and prejudice, that will support a federal habeas corpus review
when state procedural rules are not followed). See discussion beginning infra part II (cate-
gonzing miscarriage of justice as an extraordinary justification).
21. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489-94, 501-02 (1991) (extending the
cause and prejudice standard, used to excuse state procedural defaults, to federal errors).
22. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 380.
23. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary cause and
prejudice showing).
24. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 380.
25. The nuscarrage of justice exception is concerned with "actual" as distinct from
"legal" innocence. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519 (1992). For further discus-
sion of "actual" innocence as opposed to "legal" innocence see infra notes 100-18 and
accompanying text.
26. See Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 382 (asserting "[t]he execution of a prisoner who
deserves to live is a miscarriage of justice").
27. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (tracing the evolution of the cause
and prejudice standard).
28. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 380 (noting the Supreme Court has only examned the
meaning of the miscarriage of justice exception in "a preliminary way").
29. A procedurally defaulted habeas corpus petition contains claims which were not
raised in accordance with state or federal rules of procedure. See tnfra notes 63-71 and
accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of procedurally defaulted habeas corpus
claims).
30. There are two different types of repeated habeas petitions. Successive habeas pe-
titions, which contain claims identical to those raised and rejected on the merits in a prior
petition, and abusive habeas petitions, which raise claims available to, but not utilized in,
a prior petition. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986); see also Tabak &
Lane, supra note 2, at 23-28 (providing a general description of the importance of suc-
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corpus petitions in capital cases in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Sawyer v. Whitley.3 Specifically, this Note
will examine how the Sawyer v. Whitley eligibility standard for
actual innocence of the sentence,32 as applied to constitutional er-
rors in the production and evaluation of probative mitigation evi-
dence during the penalty phase of a capital trial, violates both the
principles of habeas corpus and individualized sentencing determi-
nations.33
In addition, this Note posits that the eligibility standard for
actual innocence of the death sentence offends state capital sentenc-
ing schemes in differing ways.3 This assertion is based on statu-
tory variations regarding the evaluation of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances before determining whether a death sentence is
appropriate.35 Here, the question is not whether a defendant is
eligible to receive the death penalty but whether it can properly be
applied to him.36 In particular, an eligibility standard for actual
innocence distorts the capital sentencing process in states which
require the sentencer to weigh37 (as opposed to merely consid-
er)31 the balance between aggravating and mitigating evidence be-
fore determining whether a defendant, whose sentencing hearing
was infected with critical mitigation errors, deserves the punishment
of death.39 In sum, tins Note argues that newly produced mitigat-
cessive petitions in death penalty cases).
31. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
32. See mfra part II (defining the eligibility standard as requiring a habeas prisoner to
show but for the constitutional error at his sentencing hearing, no reasonable jury would
have found him eligible for the death penalty); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
537-38 (1986) (importing the concept of actual sentencing innocence into habeas corpus
terminology).
33. See infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text (explaining the two components of
the sentencing phase and the differences of these phases).
34. See infra part V (examining variations in state capital sentencing schemes).
35. See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text (dividing jurisdictions into "weigh-
ing" or "considering" states).
36. See mnfra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (describing the process by which the
sentencer examnes "individualized considerations" to determine if a particular defendant
deserves to die).
37. See mfra notes 170-74 and accompanying text (noting that "weighing" states can
impose the death sentence where the defendant is convicted of a capital crime, at least
one aggravating circumstance is present, and the gravity of the aggravating circumstances
outweighs those circumstances which mitigate against the death penalty).
38. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (defining such "consideration" as in-
volving the presence of a capital crime, at least one statutory aggravating circumstance,
and consideration of any statutory mitigating circumstances).
39. See infra part V
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ing evidence should satisfy a showing of actual sentencing inno-
cence so as to permit federal review of defaulted, successive or
abusive habeas corpus petitions under the miscarriage of justice
exception."
Part I traces the nature and scope of habeas corpus relief in
the constitutional system. Part II defines the role of the fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice and actual innocence exception in capital
habeas corpus petitions. Part HI compares conflicting standards
used by federal courts to judge actual innocence. Part IV outlines
the Sawyer v. Whitley eligibility standard for actual innocence of
the death sentence. Part V assesses the impact of the eligibility
standard on varying state sentencing schemes and asks whether an
accurate death sentence can be established in the face of mitigation
errors. Part VI outlines a standard of actual innocence which recog-
nizes differences in state sentencing schemes but predicts a bleak
future for actually innocent capital defendants.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
A. The Basic Requirements
To be eligible to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus, based on constitutional error either at trial or sentencing,
state prisoners must first exhaust4' all available state judicial reme-
dies.42 This means that before a federal court reaches the merits
of a constitutional claim, the petitioner must carry his claim
through three distinct judicial processes: first, trial and direct ap-
peal;43 second, state postconviction review;" and third, federal
40. See infra part VI.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (requiring that a petitioner who seeks habeas corpus
relief first exhaust all state court remedies before applying to a federal court for relief);
see also Murray v. Carer, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986) (stating "the exhaustion doc-
trine is 'pnncipally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of
federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings"' (quoting Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982))); KAMISAR El AL., supra note 1, at 1518 (noting that the
exhaustion requirement is part of the "equitable nature" of habeas corpus).
42. Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 8 (outlining what constitutes exhausting state court
remedies).
43. Id.
[A] defendant who is tried in the state trial court must [first]
appeal his conviction to a state appellate court. The direct appeal, unlike collat-
eral proceedings such as habeas corpus, is in most states confined to issues
apparent from the record of the case. If he loses on his initial direct ap-
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habeas corpus review
B. The Controversy
The use of the "great writ of liberty"45 has become enor-
mously controversial since the Supreme Court expanded federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction in 1963.46 Critics of habeas corpus con-
tend that the writ, when used "improperly," impedes finality in
state court judgments.47 Thus, the writ violates federalism-based
principles of state sovereignty 4 For example, it is contended that
there is "nothing more subversive [to] a state judge's sense of re-
sponsibility than an indiscriminate acceptance of the [fact] that
all the shots will be called by someone else"49 through the "auto-
matic collateral relitigation model"5 of habeas corpus.
peal, [certiorari to the United States Supreme Court may follow].
If certiorari is denied following the inmate's direct appeal[,]
[then] collateral attack is the only means of challenging the legality of the
conviction or punishment.
Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
44. State postconviction (or collateral) remedies can be viewed as analogous to the
federal habeas corpus statutes found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1988). Like their federal
counterparts, state postconviction remedies are intended to provide relief for those in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution. Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack:
Towards a New State Postconviction Remedy, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 333, 333 (1992). To-
day, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have some form of postconviction reme-
dy. Id., see also WILKES, supra note 3, §§ 9-3 to 9-5 & Appendix A (providing a de-
tailed state-by-state survey of current postconviction remedies).
45. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 678 (1989) (attributing this
title to the fact that "habeas corpus protects individuals against arbitrary and wrongful
impnsonment").
46. Fay v. Noia, 373 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963) (acknowledging the broad power to
grant a writ of habeas corpus for "whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints");
see also ROBBINS, supra note 12, at 41 (discussing expansion of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion after Fay).
47. ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 41 (stating that "[s]ome members of the state judicia-
ry view federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions as an af-
front to their sovereignty").
48. Id.
49. Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also KAMISAR El AL., supra
note 1, at 1530 (evaluating the extent to which federal habeas corpus review has "straned
the institutional relationship between federal courts and state courts and diminished the
'sense of responsibility of state judges'). But see American Bar Association Policy Rec-
ommendations on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, ABA CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION (1990),
reprinted in ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 20. ("[M]any state supreme court judges and
justices either feel no resentment when federal courts address the merits of state death-row
inmates' claims or actually invite federal consideration. Often they express relief that the
state court does not have the final say.").
50. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 15.1, at 680 (quoting Professor Paul Bator and
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On the other hand, proponents of habeas corpus emphasize
that collateral review is needed to correct erroneous state court
judgments or proceedings." For the over 2,500 prisoners currently
on death row,52 99.5 % of whom are indigent and unable to af-
ford private counsel, 3 the remedy is especially important as con-
stitutional errors are common in state death penalty litigation.' In
addition, defenders of the writ argue that habeas corpus and its "ju-
dicial redundancy,"55 not only corrects constitutional error,56 but
also increases the legitimacy of convictions and sentences without
consuming a large amount of federal court resources.'
C. The Rehnquist Era Court's Response
To a large extent, the critics of habeas corpus have won the
battle as the Court has constructed numerous procedural rules de-
signed to prevent state prisoners from gaining access to federal
courts.58 In particular, the Rehnquist Court has made it more diffi-
cult to mount procedurally defaulted9 or repetitive'° habeas chal-
noting habeas corpus is "profligate with resources at a time of increasing scarcity"). How-
ever, as a result of Rehnquist Court decisions, federal habeas corpus can hardly be con-
strued as an "automatic" process. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 897-98
(1993) (rejecting a habeas petition based upon state capital sentencing statute which alleg-
edly prevented a jury from adequately considenng all relevant mitigating evidence);
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860-61 (1993) (rejecting a successive habeas petition
based upon newly discovered evidence of innocence).
51. See Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 416 (discussing habeas corpus as a safety valve for
procedural defaults).
52. Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 4.
53. Debra C. Moss, Death, Habeas and Good Lawyers: Balancing Fairness and Finali-
ty, A.B.A. J., December 1992, at 82, 85.
54. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 11 (asserting that "state death penalty pro-
ceedings have been so frequently flawed by constitutional error that has not been correct-
ed on appeal or in state collateral proceedings that about forty percent of all state court
capital judgments have been reversed by federal courts").
55. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 15.1, at 681 (quoting Professor Cover who asserts
that habeas corpus serves many functions).
56. Id.
57. Id. (noting that defenders of habeas corpus argue "that there is no evidence that
the existence of [the writ] has any effect on the criminal justice system"); see also
WILKES, supra note 3, § 8-2 (surveying data from 1966 to 1981 and finding that habeas
corpus applications contributed marginally to the overall workload of the federal distnct
courts).
58. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 379.
59. Delayed petitions involve claims which because of an absence of due diligence,
have not been timely filed in accordance with state procedural rules. See RULES GOVERN-
ING § 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DIST. COURTS Rule 9(a) (codified following
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)); see infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing cases
which have emphasized state procedural rules and, as a result, have restricted habeas
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lenges to state court errors." By requxnng prisoners seeking habe-
as relief to raise all potential constitutional claims in their first
petition, the Rehnquist Court has blocked three types of allegedly
"improper" habeas petitions: (1) defaulted petitions; (2) successive
petitions; and (3) abusive petitions.62
1. Bars to Defaulted Petitions
A critical inquiry in modem federal habeas review of state
criminal proceedings is whether the petitioner complied with state
rules of procedure in raising his constitutional claim.'a When a
petitioner has not complied with these procedural rules, the petition
is considered procedurally flawed.' In other words, procedural
default results when a federal court refuses to reach the merits of a
constitutional claim65 because the claim was not raised properly
within the state system on direct appeal or on postconviction re-
view66 However, prior to 1977, the Supreme Court maintained
that a federal court had the power to consider a state prisoner's
federal constitutional claim, notwithstanding his procedural default,
if the prisoner had not "deliberately bypassed" the state forum as
part of his litigation strategy 67
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Wanwrght v. Sykes,6" began
review by a federal court).
60. Repeated petitions contain claims raised unsuccessfully in the first petition (suc-
cessive petitions) or claims that should have been raised in the first petition but were not
(abusive petitions). See RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE UNnED STATES DIST.
COURTS Rule 9(b) (codified following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)); see also Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (noting the cause and prejudice standard has been
extended to repeated petitions); Tabak & Lane, supra note 2, at 23-28 (providing a gener-
al description of successive petitions and their importance in death penalty cases).
61. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 379.
62. See supra notes 29-30 (defining these terms).
63. See ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 76 (emphasizing the importance of following state
procedural rules as these rules can "foreclose later consideration of matters that were not
properly raised at trial").
64. Id.
65. Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 418 (giving the failure to raise a claim in a timely
fashion as an example of procedural default).
66. ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 76 (discussing state procedural bars to habeas corpus
petitions).
67. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434, 438 (1963) (establishing the notion that federal
courts have the power to consider a state prisoner's federal constitutional claim and defin-
ing the deliberate bypass exception to this rule); see also ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 76
(discussing the deliberate bypass exception to the federal court's ability to hear a habeas
corpus claim "notwithstanding his failure to raise the claim properly" within the state
court).
68. 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (rejecting a habeas corpus claim alleging that a confes-
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the modem trend toward the ngid, and perhaps unyielding, enforce-
ment of state procedural rules based on notions, of federalism,
comity and finality 69 The Wainwright Court held that the merits
of a procedurally defaulted claim could be heard by a federal court
only if the petitioner could demonstrate both cause for his failure
to comply with the state procedural rules and actual prejudice re-
sulting therefrom. 0 This stricter standard signaled the Court's de-
cision to defer to state procedural requirements over an individual's
constitutional claims.?
2. Other Bars to Defaulted, Successive and Abusive Petitions
Modem habeas review has also been transformed by the Rules
Governing Habeas Corpus72 which commit the decision to deny
access to a federal forum to the sound discretion of the federal
court.73 Recognizing that prisoners often raise defaulted or repeti-
tive constitutional claims (since neither a statute of limitations nor
res judicata applies to habeas proceedings),74 the Rules have en-
abled the courts to summarily dismiss petitions that appear to take
advantage of the system or cause some prejudice to the state.75 As
sion was obtained in violation of the petitioner's Miranda rights because the petitioner
failed to make a timely objection under the Flonda contemporaneous objection rule).
69. ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 77 (criticizing Fay v. Nora because it "accorded too
little respect to state procedural rules").
70. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84-87. Although the Wainwrght Court did not define
cause and prejudice, a series of later decisions interpreted the terms. See, e.g., Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (stating "cause must ordinarily turn on whether
the pnsoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts to comply with [s]tate[] procedural rule[s]") (emphasis added). Cause
has been interpreted to include ineffective assistance of counsel and the novelty of a legal
claim. See, e.g., Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel
constitutes cause); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (recognizing cause for a proce-
dural default where the petitioner's claim was "so novel that its legal basis [was] not
reasonably available to counsel"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 (1982) (raising but
declining to decide the issue of whether novelty of a legal claim could constitute cause).
71. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 135 (dismissing a defaulted habeas corpus claim
where there was no cause for failing to object to a burden of proof instruction for self-
defense even though the instruction was prejudicial).
72. RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE UNrrED STATES DIST. COURTS (codified
following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)).
73. Jane A. Gordon, Pleading Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus: Sua
Sponte Departure from Precedent and Congressional Intent, 38 EMORY L.J. 489, 489
(1989) (examining the Court's authority to dismiss habeas corpus claims sua sponte).
74. Id. at 495 (noting these "critical exceptions to ordinary civil practice ensure that
prisoners have full opportunity to seek the writ of habeas corpus to preserve their consti-
tutional rights").
75. Id. (stating Rule 9 dismisses petitions that abuse or misuse the state system).
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a result, Rule 9 has been extensively utilized to bar defaulted,
successive and abusive petitions from the federal system.76
Rule 9 has been supplemented by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McCleskey v. Zant which extended the cause and preju-
dice standard from the context of procedurally defaulted claims78
to the context of successive or abusive petitions. 9 As a conse-
quence, the Rehnquist Court has succeeded in "erecting '[its own]
maze of procedural requirements and booby traps' for prisoners
seeking [delayed or repetitive] habeas corpus relief."'
76. Id. at 489.
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respon-
dent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition
by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence
before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
Id. (quoting Rule 9(a) and addressing the district court's discretion to dismiss delayed
petitions).
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it
falls to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination
was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds
that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition con-
stituted an abuse of the writ.
Id. at 490 (quoting Rule 9(b) on successive or abusive petitions and noting this Rule.
along with Rule 9(a), was designed to allow courts "to dismiss summarily those petitions
that constitute an abuse or misuse of the system").
77. MeCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (holding that federal courts may not
hear successive habeas claims raising new issues unless the petitioner had cause for the
delay and was actually prejudiced therefrom).
78. See supra notes 68-71 (describing Wainwright and the cause and prejudice stan-
dard).
79. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494 (asserting "[t]he cause and prejudice analysis we have
adopted for cases of procedural default applies to an abuse of the writ inquiry").
80. Moss, supra note 53, at 83, 86 (quoting Bryan Stephenson, director of the Ala-
bama Capital Representation Resource Center, and concluding that "under McCleskey most
inmates will be entitled to only one federal habeas appeal"); see also Coleman v. Thomp-
son, Ill S. Ct. 2546, 2566-67 (1991) (dismissing habeas petition of a death-row inmate
because filing error made by his lawyers in state posteonviction proceedings did not con-
stitute cause). But see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1718, 1721 (1992)
(utilizing the cause and prejudice standard, rather than the deliberate bypass standard and
granting a manslaughter defendant an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition to show
cause for his failure to develop a record in the state proceedings and prejudice therefrom;
petitioner was a Cuban immigrant who spoke little English and who received no explana-
tion from an interpreter on the mens rea requirement for manslaughter).
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IX. THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND
ACTUAL INNOCENCE IN CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
Where a defendant raises a defaulted, successive or abusive
petition and cannot establish cause or prejudice for failing to com-
ply with state or federal habeas rules, is he completely denied
access to the federal system in order to present the merits of his
constitutional claim? The answer is no. Even if the petitioner can-
not meet this standard, the court is obligated to make one more
inquiry before dismissing the petition. The court must ask whether
the defendant is a victim of a fundamental miscarmage of jus-
tice." If so, the court should accept the otherwise defaulted, suc-
cessive or abusive petition to review the delayed or repetitive con-
stitutional claim.
82
A. The Ongins of Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence
What, then, precisely constitutes a nuscarnage of justice?
According to traditional habeas jurisprudence, a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice occurs whenever a conviction or a sentence is
secured in violation of federal constitutional law 83 However, in
1986, the Supreme Court turned away from this traditional under-
standing of habeas corpus when it attempted to clarify the precise
contours of the miscarrage of justice standard as applied to de-
layed or repetitive petitions.' In a trio of habeas decisions that
year, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,"5 Murray v. Carrier86 and Smith v.
81. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 391 (noting a "failure to show cause is not the end of
the habeas corpus inquiry even where there is procedural default").
82. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 403 n.l14. The petitioner is not required to argue that
he has been a victim of a fundamental miscarriage of justice; rather the court has an
obligation to prevent a miscarriage of justice from taking place. Id. at 403.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) (stating federal courts "shall entertain an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus" from state prisoners who charge that they are "in custo-
dy in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"); see also
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525-26 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurrng) (citing
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88 (1923) for the proposition that the "concern of a
federal court in reviewing the validity of a conviction and death sentence on writ of
habeas corpus is 'solely the question of whether [the petitioner's] constitutional rights have
been preserved').
84. See ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 85 (describing the Court's focus as a shift from
constitutional to non-constitutional concerns).
85. 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (defining the "ends of justice" standard which determines
whether federal habeas corpus review should be granted "to effectuate the clear intent of
Congress that successive federal habeas review should be granted only in rare cases").
86. 477 U.S. 478 (1986); see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (defining the
actual innocence standard).
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Murray,7 the Rehnquist Court demonstrated its increasing preoc-
cupation with the issue of innocence in habeas corpus cases."8 In
doing so, the Court abandoned its long-standing concern with con-
stitutional errors for non-constitutional inquiries relating to the
petitioner's guilt or innocence.8 9 Essentially, the trio signaled the
Rehnquist Court's new commitment to making the issue of inno-
cence the primary inquiry in any habeas claim based on a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice.'
More important, for the purposes of the present inquiry, is
Murray v. Came?' which brought the concept of actual inno-
cence into habeas corpus terminology In Carrier, the Court refused
to entertain a procedurally defaulted petition because the petitioner
could not establish cause for the default.92 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized its independent responsibility to correct a fundamentally
unjust incarceration of an innocent defendant despite a failure to
show cause.
"[I]n appropriate cases" the principles of comity and finali-
ty that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice "must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust
incarceration." We remain confident that, for the most part,
"victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet
the cause-and-prejudice standard." But we do not pretend
that this will always be true. Accordingly, we think that in
an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
87. 477 U.S. 527 (1986); see mfra notes 96-105 and accompanying text (noting Smith
moved the concept of actual innocence into the sentencing context).
88. See ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 85.
89. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2526 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurrng)
(The Court has "shifted the focus of federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted,
successive, or abusive claims away from the preservation of constitutional rights to a fact-
based inquiry into the petitioner's innocence or guilt"); see also ROBBINS, supra note 11,
at 85 (noting that while "the guilt/innocence determination traditionally has been the pre-
rogative of the states[, t]he task of the federal courts has been to preserve the in-
tegrity of national law").
90. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 381 (asserting "[jimprisonment of the actually innocent
defendant represents for most of the Justices the definitive 'miscarrage of justice'). But
see Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993) (holding that new evidence of a
petitioner's innocence of a crime does not constitute a constitutional violation which can
support federal habeas review).
91. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
92. Id. at 489. The petitioner claimed that "he had been denied due process of law by
the prosecution's withholding of the victim's statements." Id. at 482.
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innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in
the absence of a showing for the procedural default. 3
Additionally, the concern for the habeas petitioner who is actu-
ally innocent of the crime charged is not limited to the context of
procedural default; the actual innocence inquiry extends to succes-
sive and abusive habeas petitions as well.94 This extension ensures
that the jurisprudence of innocence in habeas corpus covers all
constitutional claims "improperly" brought before a federal court.
Furthermore, while the conviction of an innocent person may
be the archetypal case of actual innocence, the concept also targets
niscamages of justice in other contexts. Specifically, claims of
actual innocence reach an alleged constitutional error at the sen-
tencing determination.95 For the purposes of this Note, such error
will be examined in the capital sentencing context.
This complete coverage of trial and sentencing errors is the
result of the third innocence case of 1986, Smith v. Murray,96
which carried the actual innocence inquiry into the sentencing con-
text.97 However, the Smith Court did recognize the difficulty in
making this move from legal to actual innocence for "innocence
does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the
sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense."" Nevertheless,
the Court held that a defendant could be actually innocent of a
death sentence, thus establishing a new innocence consideration in
capital habeas corpus cases.99
93. Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982).
94. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (holding that the miscarriage
of justice exception would allow successive claims to be heard if the petitioner "estab-
lish[es] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual innocence")
(emphasis added). The standard has been defined as:
[A] fair probability that, in light of all evidence, including that alleged to have
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and
evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become
available only after the trial, the trier of fact would have entertained a reason-
able doubt of his guilt.
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Relevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHi. L. REv. 142, 160 (1970) (citation omitted).
95. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 381, 398-99.
96. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
97. Id. at 536-38 (ignoring error in a capital case involving the admission of psychi-
atric testimony at sentencing allegedly obtained in violation of defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
98. Id. at 537.
99. Id., see Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 398-403 (developing the concept of sentencing
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B. Actual Innocence in Capital Sentencing
Drawing on Smith, a tentative definition of actual innocence in
capital sentencing can be formulated."u According to the Smith
Court, actual sentencing innocence requires a constitutional error
which either "precluded the development of true facts [or] resulted
in the admission of false ones."'0' Essentially, either type of error
must have undermined the accuracy of the sentencing determina-
tion by perverting the jury's deliberations concerning the ultimate
question of whether the petitioner deserves to live or die."o
The question then arises as to what type of constitutional error
undermines the Smith accuracy standard in the capital sentencing
context. In making this determination, it must be recalled that the
actual innocence exception for defaulted, successive or abusive
claims is available only under exceptional circumstances. 3 There-
fore, the type of error to which the standard applies initially is
limited. Following the 1992 decision in Sawyer v. Whitley,1" this
range of targetable constitutional error has been circumscribed even
further."
1. Accuracy-Related Errors upon Which Capital Sentencing
Innocence May Be Based
The Smith decision offers two clear examples of capital sen-
tencing innocence: (1) a situation where the alleged constitutional
error "resulted in the admission of false [information]";" 6 and (2)
a situation where the error "precluded the development of true
facts." 7 The present discussion will focus on the second ground
innocence); see also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989) (repeating the sen-
tencing innocence formula of Smith in a capital case without defining "what it means to
be 'actually innocent of a death sentence"').
100. Again, it must be recognized that innocence in capital sentencing is an issue inde-
pendent of innocence of the underlying charge. Ledewitz, supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
101. 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992) (emphasizing the nar-
rowness of the actual innocence exception).
104. Id.
105. See infra notes part III and part IV (discussing Sawyer and its impact).
106. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986). See Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 406-10
(noting these potential errors include the admittance of: (1) false prosecution testimony or
evidence; (2) unreliable victim impact statements; and (3) unreliable or statutorily-invalid
aggravating evidence).
107. 477 U.S. at 538. It should also be recognized that studies during the past decade
by federal judges and defense groups have revealed that federal appellate courts found
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for sentencing innocence under the Smith standard.
The category of error which would seem to most clearly "pre-
clude[] the development of true facts"' 8 are errors which affect
the production, and thus- evaluation, of mitigating evidence 9 at
the sentencing stage of a capital trial-the site of the ultimate
life/death decision."0 For a myriad of reasons, however, the case
of mitigation is often plagued by problems which may preclude the
full development of probative mitigating evidence,"' encouraging
precisely the type of error that the Smith standard targets.
A problem commonly encountered in this area is the discovery
of mitigating evidence that should have, but was not, presented at
the original sentencing hearing"' because of counsel's neglect. In
fact, "[i]t is not unusual for an attorney confronting a death penalty
case at the collateral stage to see little or no mitigating evidence in
the record..'.3 However, unless the initial failure to present ade-
quate mitigating evaluate constitutes constitutional error, as in the
case where there is ineffective assistance of counsel,"4 the attor-
constitutional errors in 40 % to 73 % of state death penalty cases reviewed on the merits.
Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 1I, 1990, at 2.
108. 477 U.S. at 538.
109. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (defining mitigating circum-
stances as those that "do not constitute justification or excuse for the offense in question,
but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpa-
bility"); see also Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 416 (providing examples of mitigating evi-
dence including: substantial drug and alcohol abuse; history of severe abuse as a child;
social, educational or economic deprivations; and brain damage or other intellectual im-
pairments).
110. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 404 (noting that the unavailability of mitigating evi-
dence is a category that "most clearly satisfies the innocence standard").
111. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequate represen-
tation by counsel in death penalty cases); see also Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 416 (listing
the factors which undermine the development of a full mitigation case including over-
worked or inexperienced defense counsel and the difficulty of obtaining mitigation evi-
dence).
112. See Friendly, supra note 94, at 159 n.87 (noting "that there exists evidence of
material facts, not heretofore presented and heard, which require vacation of the conviction
or sentence in the interest of justice"); see also Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 414-16 (dis-
cussing the merits of Friendly's "after-discovered" mitigating evidence standard for habeas
review).
113. Ledewitz, supra note 9, at 417; see also Justice Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on
the Death Penalty at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 6. 1985), in 109
F.R.D. 443, 444 (1985), and in 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (with slight modification)
("The federal reporters are filled with stones of counsel who presented no evidence in
mitigation of their client's sentences, simply because they did not know what to offer or
how to offer it, or had not read the state sentencing statute.").
114. See Marshall, supra note 113, in 109 F.R.D. at 445, and in 86 COLUM. L. REV. at
3 (asserting "many capital defendants find that errors by their lawyers preclude presenta-
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ney must argue that the unearthed mitigating evidence supports a
claim of sentencing innocence that can be heard in a defaulted or
repetitive habeas petition. After the decision in Sawyer v. Whit-
ley," the attorney left in such position may only regret, as op-
posed to effectively contest on habeas, the failure to present ade-
quate mitigating evidence."6
However, the failure to find or present substantial mitigating
evidence is especially problematic in capital cases for fundamental
Eighth Amendment considerations are raised."7 Specifically, the
question arises whether the petitioner received the individualized
sentencing determination mandated by the Constitution."' There-
fore, it is useful to briefly review the parameters of the modem
system of capital punishment in order to appreciate fully the im-
pact of mitigation errors on claims of capital sentencing innocence.
2. Mitigation Evidence and Individualized Capital Sentencing
Since 1976,"' the capital trial has been split into two distinct
parts: (1) the guilt-determination phase; and (2) the sentencing
phase. 2 At the sentencing phase, "[t]he most visible by-product
of the modem era of capital punishment,'' the life/death deci-
sion again divides into two separate, constitutionally-based sub-
parts: (1) the "guided discretion" stage where the class of defen-
tion of substantial constitutional claims, but that such errors-with resulting forfeitures of
rights-are not enough in themselves to constitute ineffective assistance"). See generally
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a deferential standard by
which to determine whether the mistakes of an attorney constitute ineffective representa-
tion under the Sixth Amendment; the standard requires the defendant to show both that
the representation was objectively unreasonable and that prejudice resulted therefrom).
115. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992).
116. See infra part V (asserting the Sawyer standard eliminates the impact of mitigating
evidence).
117. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
siVe fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
118. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (stating that for the death
penalty to satisfy Eighth Amendment concerns the sentencer must consider factors unique
to the case); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1991) (stating
that the sentencer must, according to the Eighth Amendment, "consider all evidence con-
cerning the offender and the offense that might argue for a sentence less than death").
119. Prior to 1976, most states provided for "unitary capital trials" where a jury adjudi-
cated guilt and punishment in a single proceeding. WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN THE NINETIES 73 (1991).
120. Id. at 5-7.
121. Id. at 73.
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dants who are "eligible" for death is defined; and (2) the "individ-
ualized consideration" stage where the sentencer considers the
specific circumstances of the defendant and the crime (or mitigat-
ing evidence) before deciding whether the defendant deserves to
die." By dividing the death sentencing decision into two stages,
a court may then treat aggravating and mitigating factors separately
since they address distinct aspects of the decision-making pro-
cess.
t
During the guided discretion stage, the state must narrow the
pool of capital defendants who are "eligible" to receive the penalty
of death. This "death eligibility" is determined by applying statuto-
rily-based aggravating factors, 24 such as the previous convictions
of the defendant and the heinousness, atrociousness and cruelty of
the murder."2 The task of determining whether these aggravating
circumstances exist is essentially uncomplicated and objective,
requiring primary reference to historical facts.1
6
However, after the sentencer establishes that the defendant is
122. Sundby, supra note 118, at 1148. The Supreme Court adopted this two-stage pro-
cess in a series of cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (upholding
a Georgia statute which defined the class of defendants who are eligible for the death
penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (concluding that North
Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute was unconstitutional because it ignored indi-
vidual circumstances); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (finding the Ohio
death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not permit the sentencer to con-
sider all relevant mitigating factors). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639. 656
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (calling for the abandonment of the Woodson-Lockett
principle of individualized consideration since it conflicts with the principle of guided
discretion).
123. Sundby, supra note 118, at 1164; see also WHITE, supra note 119, at 73 (stating
"[a]lthough the precise issues to be determined in the penalty trial vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, under nearly all of the current death penalty statutes 'the judge or jury
finds and considers certain aggravating and mitigating facts about the defendant's crime or
character and then sentences him to either execution or life imprisonment') (quoting
Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 305, 306).
124. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (Michie Supp. 1992). Under the Arkansas
Code, aggravating circumstances can include: (1) a capital murder committed by a person
imprisoned because of a felony conviction; (2) a capital murder comntted by a felon
who had escaped imprisonment; (3) a previous violent crime; (4) a great risk of death to
a person other than the victim; (5) a capital murder committed to avoid arrest; (6) a
capital murder committed for pecuniary gain; (7) a capital murder committed to disrupt
the lawful exercise of any government or political function; and (8) a capital murder corn-
nutted in an especially cruel or depraved manner. Id.
125. See Sundby, supra note 118, at 1154 (noting "[tihe aggravating circumstances used
in death penalty statutes became quite uniform among the states adopting capital punish-
ment schemes").
126. WHITE, supra note 119, at 75.
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eligible for the death penalty, his task becomes more complicated,
and, perhaps, more freewheeling. 27 At this stage, the sentencer
proceeds to the more delicate and nebulous question2 . of whether
the particular defendant should live or die; that is, even if the
defendant is eligible to receive the death penalty, should it be
applied to him? This discretionary decision can be made only after
the sentencer has considered all mitigating evidence concermng the
defendant and the crime. 29 Although state statutes outline the
mitigating circumstances that a sentencer may consider,1 30  the
statutory lists are not exhaustive.' 3' A sentencer may exercise in-
dependent judgment in determining whether other evidence should
be treated as a mitigating circumstance.'
In sum, the issues to be decided at the "death eligibility" stage
and the "death deserving" stage are critically different.'33 These
differences warrant the separate examination of error at either stage
127. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-69 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(stressing the constitutional difficulties caused by the unchanneled discretion of the
sentencer during the consideration of mitigating evidence).
128. WHn, supra note 119, at 75 (noting this question is more complex because juries
must make value judgments, weigh evidence and use their independent judgment as to
what mitigating circumstance may be important).
129. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (asserting that "the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital case, [can]not be precluded from considering as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death") (second
and third emphasis added).
130. Statutory mitigating circumstances primarily focus on the nature and circumstances
of the offense, as well as the history, character and background of the particular offender.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Anderson 1993). These circumstances can
include: (1) whether the victim of the capital murder induced or facilitated the offense;
(2) whether the capital murder was coerced or provoked; (3) whether the offender was
mentally incapacitated at the time of the capital murder, (4) the age of the offender, (5)
the prior crinunal history of the offender, and (6) the degree of the offender's participa-
tion m the offense if he was not the principal offender. Id. at (3)(1)-(6).
131. ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 75.
132. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606 n.15 (permitting additional mitigating circumstances to be
used where a Florida statute contained no limiting language in the list of mitigating cir-
cumstances). State statutes support such broad sentencing discretion. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2929.04(B)(7) (Anderson 1993) (noting that the sentencing authority may
consider and weigh "[any other [mitigating] factors that are relevant to the issue of
whether the offender should be sentenced to death"); see also Fred Strasser, Complex,
Subtle Questions in Two-Part Capital Trials, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, at 13 (pointing
out that defense attorneys must "try to humanize the defendant through [any mitigating
evidence such as] character witnesses who tell [the defendant's] life story[,]
psychological testimony describing an abused, violent childhood or very low IQ [and]
[m]edieal testimony describ[ing] brain damage").
133. ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 75.
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when a habeas claim of actual sentencing innocence is reviewed.
However, the decision in Sawyer v. Whitley seems to undermine
both the foundation of the second capital sentencing stage as well
as the continued utility of sentencing innocence claims on habeas
corpus."3 In fact, the decision marks a significant turn from past
precedent and the constitutionally-consistent sentencing innocence
standards of a number of federal circuit courts.
35
III. PRE-SAWYER INTERPRETATIONS CONCERNING THE
STANDARD FOR SENTENCING INNOCENCE
Prior to Sawyer v. Whitley, a number of federal circuit courts
had split on the actual innocence test for habeas review of errors at
the sentencing phase of a capital case. Some courts have taken a
"constitutionally-consistent '' 33 approach, while others have taken a
"constitutionally-repugnant" approach. 37 It was this divergence in
standards which ultimately provided the Rehnquist Court with yet
another opportunity, in the form of Sawyer v. Whitley, to further
restrict the availability of habeas corpus. 31
Before Sawyer, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits had established a
standard of actual sentencing innocence for capital cases which was
consistent with the 1986 decision in Smith v. Murray; that is, their
innocence formula focused on whether death was an appropriate
punishment for the individual petitioner involved. Under this "accu-
racy-based" approach, a fundamental miscarriage of justice would
occur "[w]here [the] constitutional violation more probably
than not resulted in a capital sentence for one who should not
have been sentenced to death."'39 In other words, the error proba-
134. See infra parts IV and V
135. See mfra parts III and IV
136. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the "accuracy-based"
approach of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits which focuses on whether the constitutional
violation probably resulted in an inappropriate sentence of death).
137. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing the eligibility standard
followed by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits which focuses on whether the constitutional
violation resulted in a sentence of death for which the defendant was ineligible.).
138. See Linda Greenhouse, Push to Limit Habeas Corpus Petitions Continues, 138 CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., May 6, 1992, at 1 (noting that "[the Rehnquist Court] has reached out
to add habeas corpus cases to its docket, and has made clear in this as in no other area
its displeasure with the way the modem law has developed").
139. Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see
also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1986) (establishing a formula to test wheth-
er, due to identified errors in the process of his conviction, the defendant is innocent of
the sentence imposed); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismiss-
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bly resulted in a death sentence when only a sentence of life im-
prisonment was appropriate.' Such errors would include the fail-
ure to present true facts,' such as substantial ntigating evi-
dence.
142
By comparison, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits pronounced a
sentencing innocence standard which offended both Eighth Amend-
ment capital pumshment principles and established Supreme Court
precedent."' Under this standard a failure to present true mitigat-
ing facts could not serve as the basis for a claim of sentencing
innocence. Rather, the alleged error must have tainted all of the
aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing body, resulting
in a sentence for which the defendant was ineligible by virtue of
his conduct. 44 Accordingly, a fact-based error which could have
affected the sentencing outcome is insufficient to gain federal habe-
as review, because:
Even if the guilty defendant can demonstrate that a consti-
tutional error led to a factual inaccuracy-which in turn
prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing body's delibera-
tive process-the defendant is not innocent of the sentence
ing a claim of sentencing innocence, based on instructional error regarding juror evalua-
tion of mitigating circumstances but repeating the sentencing innocence formula articulated
in Smith).
140. Deutscher, 946 F.2d at 1444 (explaining that a habeas writ is necessary when a
defendant has been sentenced to the death penalty "more probably than not" due to a
constitutional violation); see also Stokes, 893 F.2d at 156 (miscarriage of justice exception
applies if a constitutional error more probably than not resulted in a verdict of death).
141. See Smith, 477 U.S. at 538. In Smith, the Court did not find sentencing innocence,
writing that "the alleged constitutional error neither precluded the development of true
facts nor resulted in the admission of false ones [therefore,] [u]nder these circum-
stances, we do not believe that refusal to consider the defaulted claim on federal habeas
carries with it the risk of a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. The clear inference from
this is that had the Court found such error, precluding the development of the actual fac-
tual circumstances in the case, it would have ordered federal habeas review based on
sentencing innocence.
142. See Deutscher, 946 F.2d at 1446 (sentencing innocence found where counsel failed
to present mitigating evidence and to challenge unconstitutional aggravating factor). But
see Stokes, 893 F.2d at 153 (sentencing innocence not found because counsel deliberately
chose not to offer any mitigating evidence, in line with the defendant's complete inno-
cence defense).
143. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ("[W]here a constitutional vio-
latlon has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the pro-
cedural default.").
144. Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 361 (1992).
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imposed.
[Rather, to establish sentencing innocence,] the petitioner
must show that absent the alleged constitutional error, the
jury would have lacked the discretion to impose the death
penalty; that is, that he is ineligible for the death penal-
ty 145
It is this constitutionally-repugnant eligibility standard for sentenc-
ing innocence which the Rehnquist Court adopted in Sawyer v.
Whitley.
IV RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT?: SAWYER V. WHITLEY
Sawyer v. Whitley'46 forced the United States Supreme Court
to define, or at least attempt to define, the requisite standard for
actual sentencing innocence where capital defendants assert that a
fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur in the absence of
federal consideration of their defaulted or repeated habeas claims.
Although the decision was intended to resolve the sentencing inno-
cence dispute among the circuits, it, in fact, raised serious ques-
tions about the Eighth Amendment principles upon which our
modem capital punishment jurisprudence is based. Specifically, the
eligibility for the death penalty standard established ignores the
second fundamental tenet of capital punishment: individualized
sentencing determinations which play a critical role in state capital
sentencing schemes.'47
In Sawyer, the defendant claimed in his second habeas petition
to have been wrongfully sentenced to death. 4 However, he was
145. Id. Originally the Fifth Circuit did not use the term "eligibility" itself when de-
scribing its actual innocence test, instead referring to the jury's "authority to impose the
death penalty." Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 1991), aft'd, 112 S. Ct.
2514 (1992).
146. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). The defendant in Sawyer was convicted of first-degree
murder. His capital sentence was supported by the finding of two statutory aggravating
factors: (I) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commis-
sion of aggravated arson, and (2) the crime was perpetrated in an "especially cruel, atro-
cious and heinous manner." Id. at 2517 n.2.
147. See infra part V
148. Specifically, he argued that the alleged failure of the police to produce exculpatory
evidence violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2524. In addition, he reasserted ineffective assistance of counsel
based on his trial counsel's failure to introduce mental health records as mitigation evi-
dence at the sentencing stage. Id.
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unable to show cause either for failing to raise certain claims in
his first petition,'49 or for repeating his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, previously raised in his original habeas request.'
Although Sawyer failed to meet the "cause and prejudice"'' re-
quirement for federal review of his abusive and successive claims
on the merits, the Court proceeded to consider whether ignoring his
claims would effect a fundamental nuscarrage of justice.52
The Sawyer court prefaced its attempt to hone the contours of
actual innocence in the capital punishment setting by noting the
complex and elusive nature of the concept.'53 Given tis difficul-
ty, the Court analyzed three possible definitions of actual sentenc-
ing innocence before selecting its preferred standard:
[1] The strictest definition would be to limit any showing
[of actual innocence] to the elements of the crime which
the State has made a capital offense. The showing would
have to negate an essential element of that offense.
[2] The most lement [definition] would allow the
showing of "actual innocence" to extend not only to the
elements of the crime, but also to the existence of aggra-
vating factors, and to mitigating evidence which bore, not
on the defendant's eligibility to receive the death penalty,
but only on the ultimate discretionary decision between the
death penalty and life imprisonment.
[3] [The intermediate approach would require that a show-
ing of] "actual innocence" focus on those elements
which render a defendant eligible for the death penalty
149. Because this claim was available when he submitted his original habeas petition, it
was considered an abuse of writ. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523.
150. This redundancy was categorized as a successive claim. Id.
151. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (refusing relief to a defendant who
deliberately by-passed the orderly procedures of the state courts): The Sawyer court ex-
plained that without a showing of cause and prejudice:
[A] court may not reach the merits of: (a) successive claims which raise
grounds identical to grounds heard and decided on the merits in a previous
petition; (b) new claims, not previously raised which constitute an abuse of the
writ; or (c) procedurally defaulted claims in which the petitioner failed to fol-
low applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims.
112 S. Ct. at 2518 (citations omitted).
152. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2518.
153. See id. at 2520 (recognizing that the difficulty lies in the phase "innocent of
death" itself, which is an unnatural usage of the words).
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[under the applicable state law], and not on additional
mitigating evidence which was prevented from being intro-
duced as a result of a claimed constitutional error."M
The Court rejected the first definition as too narrow because it
restricted a showing of actual innocence to the guilt-determining
phase, contrary to its sanctioned application to the sentencing con-
text in Smith v. Murray.'55 The "most lenient" definition "'56 was
also rejected because it equated a demonstration of prejudicial error
with a showing of actual innocence. The Court argued that this
equation was insufficient for reaching the merits of an abusive or
successive claim.'57 Instead, the Rehnquist Court adopted what it
considered to be the "middle ground,"'58 the eligibility standard
of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. In reality, instead of ratifying a
moderate approach, the Court pronounced an extremely stringent
sentencing innocence standard, one which the petitioner in Sawyer
could not satisfy
Under this new, purportedly "middle ground" approach, the
death-sentenced habeas petitioner must show "by clear and con-
vincing evidence'59 that but for a constitutional error, no reason-
154. Id. at 2521-23 (emphasis added); see also Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101, 102-
03 (5th Cir. 1992) (reviewing the three possible definitions of actual innocence articulated
by Justice Rehnquist in Sawyer).
155. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2521.
156. In Sawyer, the Petitioner advanced this standard, given the failure of his trial coun-
sel to present at his sentencing hearing critical mitigating evidence including: records of
four mental health hospitalizations, school records and reports of neurological and psy-
chiatne evaluations. Brief for Petitioner at 9-16, Sawyer (No. 91-6382). This evidence
would have raised doubts as to Mr. Sawyer's moral culpability for his crime by revealing
his mental disabilities. Id. His attorney on appeal commented that "Sawyer had a lot of
mitigation including evidence of incredible child abuse, mental retardation and organic
brain damage, but his trial counsel completely failed to investigate exactly who Sawyer
was [for purposes of his individualized sentencing determination]." Telephone Interview
with Nick Trenocosta, Co-counsel for Robert Sawyer (Oct. 5, 1992).
157. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. at 2522. The Court reasoned that:
If a showing of actual innocence were reduced to actual prejudice, it would
allow the evasion of the cause and prejudice standard which we have held also
acts as an 'exception' to a defaulted, abusive or successive claim. In practical
terms a petitioner would no longer have to show cause "
Id. at n.13. Furthermore, "[i]f federal habeas review of capital sentences is to be at all
rational, [the] petitioner must show something more in order for a court to reach the mer-
its of his claims on a successive habeas petition than he would have had to show to
obtain relief on his first " Id. at 2522.
158. Id.
159. It is unclear why the Court required clear and convincing evidence to establish
sentencing innocence. In previous actual innocence decisions, the Court had acknowledged
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able juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death
penalty under the applicable state law "" To satisfy this standard,
the majority would have required the petitioner in Sawyer to show
a constitutional error negating an aggravating circumstance which
had made Im legally eligible for the death penalty under Louisi-
ana law 1' Since errors resulting from the presentation or evalua-
tion of mitigation evidence would not alter this "death eligibility"
determination," the Sawyer standard prevents actual innocence
habeas relief on this ground.
To focus on death eligibility is misleading, as well as constitu-
tionally repugnant. The term "eligibility" itself implies that eligibili-
ty is the sole criterion in imposing a capital sentence. However, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that legal eligibility for death is
not sufficient to justify its imposition.63 Instead, once the
situations where claims that the petitioner was probably or more likely than not innocent
of the sentence received justified federal habeas relief in order to prevent a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (positing that "in
an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the convic-
tion of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in
the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default"). In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens examined the standard of proof issue at length. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.
Ct. at 2531-33 (Stevens, J., concumng) (distinguishing the context of actual sentencing
innocence from contexts in which the clear and convincing evidence standard is appropri-
ate).
160. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2517 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases have inferred from
Sawyer the Court's position on how a petitioner can prove ineligibility for death. See
Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[a]ctual inno-
cence [requires] that a jury could not have found one or more essential narrowing
factors [that] render [the] defendant eligible to have the death penalty imposed."); see
also Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The petitioner can satisfy this
[eligibility] standard by showing innocence of the crime itself, by showing no aggravating
circumstance existed, or by showing some other condition of eligibility was not met.").
161. Louisiana law requires a finding of at least one aggravating factor before a defen-
dant can be subjected to the death penalty. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West
Supp. 1993) ("A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after
consideration of any mitigating circumstances, determines that the sentence of death should
be imposed.").
162. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. at 2523. It is difficult to reconcile the Sawyer
Court's decision, which ignored errors stemming from mitigation evidence, with the seem-
ingly contradictory actual innocence standard espoused in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1985). The Court in Smith specifically rejected a sentencing innocence standard which
would ignore errors in the presentation of mitigating evidence. See id. at 538 (employing
a standard which targeted "constitutional error[s] [that either] preclud[e] the develop-
ment of true facts [or] resul[t] in the admission of false ones.").
163. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (finding unconsti-
tutional a state sentencing scheme which failed "to allow [for] the particularized consider-
ation of the character and record of each convicted defendant"); California v. Brown,
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sentencer has decided whether a defendant is eligible for the death
penalty, the sentencer must then decide "[if] the defendant should
fall out of the death penalty pool."'" This decision can be made
only after all mitigating evidence has been considered.'65
By turning its back on established precedent, the Sawyer eligi-
bility standard disregards the central role played by mitigating
evidence in individualized capital sentencing proceedings."6 This
defiance of "a constitutive element of our Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence" 67 moots attempts by the states to define the precise
contours of their capital punishment statutes.
V THE ELIGIBILITY IMPACT ON VARYING STATE
SENTENCING SCHEMES: QUESTIONS RAISED
While creating a sentencing innocence standard based on a
habeas petitioner's objective or legal eligibility for death, the Saw-
yer court did cursorily acknowledge the constitutional premise
behind individualized considerations once death eligibility has been
established. 6 However, the Court failed to consider the differing
role individualized considerations play in different state capital
sentencing schemes. These schemes not only outline whether a
defendant can receive the death penalty, in terms of the objective
eligibility for the sentence, but they also define whether the penalty
can or will be imposed, because of the subjective appropriateness
of the sentence. These state statutes illustrate that the Sawyer v.
Whitley eligibility standard for sentencing innocence is misguided,
or at least, too narrowly drawn.
479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (acknowledging that individual evaluation of mitigating evidence
is a 'constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"'
(quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304)).
164. Sundby, supra note 118, at 1163.
165. Id.
166. In Justice Stevens' words, by focusing exclusively on death eligibility and ignoring
the question of whether death is the appropriate punishment based on mitigating evidence,
"the Court today respects only one of the two bedrock principles of capital-punishment
jurisprudence" Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2534 (Stevens, J., concurrng in judgment).
167. Id. (refermng to the sentencers' consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence).
168. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2520-21 (acknowledging that the defendant must be permit-
ted to introduce mitigating evidence pertaining to his character and background once eligi-
bility for the death penalty has been established to the satisfaction of the jury).
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A. Death Eligibility and the Role of Aggravating and Mitigating
Evidence in State Capital Sentencing Schemes
The determination of whether a defendant convicted of a capi-
tal offense can or should be sentenced to death depends on how a
state, under its particular sentencing statute, evaluates aggravating
and mitigating evidence.'69 The method of evaluation, however,
differs markedly from state to state. Basically, capital sentencing
schemes can be divided into two categories: (1) schemes which
weigh the balance between aggravating and mitigating evidence,
and (2) schemes which do not weigh this balance but instead re-
quire the consideration of both types of evidence before the ulti-
mate life or death decision is made. For the purposes of the pres-
ent discussion, states using the first scheme will be referred to as
the "weighing states" and states using second scheme will be re-
ferred to as the "non-weighing states"
1. The Weighing States
In weighing states, the question of whether the death penalty
can or will be imposed is determined by the following statutory
formula: (1) conviction of a capital crime; (2) the finding of at
least one aggravating circumstance; and (3) weighing of the rmti-
gating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances. 7 ' If
factors (1) and (2) are present and the gravity of the aggravating
circumstances outweighs those circumstances arguing for a lesser
sentence, then the death penalty can,"' and in some states
169. See generally Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation:
The Improper Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41
HASTINGS LJ. 409 (1990) (providing a brief description of the current death penalty stat-
utes in United States); WHrE, supra note 119, at 73 (recognizing that the "precise issues
to be determined in the penalty trial vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction").
170. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1982) ("In deciding upon the sentence, the [sen-
tencing body] shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances "); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988) (stating that
the sentencing body should consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity
of the crime"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I1-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993) ("If any aggravating
factor is found to exist, [the sentencing body must also determine] whether it out-
weighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1993) (the sentencing body "shall determine
whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors present in the
case."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (1991) (requiring the sentencer to find that the
state has proven aggravating circumstances sufficient to outweigh mitigating circumstances).
171. These permissive sentencing statutes concern so-called "advisory verdicts or sentenc-
es" given by the initial sentencing authority. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1982)
("While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is
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will,'72 be imposed.'73 In analyzing the Sawyer v. Whitley sen-
tencing innocence standard, it is the third element which is most
significant.
At the capital sentencing stage in weighing states, statutes
require a balancing of aggravating and mitigating evidence. 4
Therefore, theoretically, a death sentence cannot be imposed until
the requisite weighing process has been performed, and the balance
has tipped away from the mitigating evidence and towards the
aggravating evidence.
However, by requiring a defendant to show that he was not
eligible for the death penalty, 75 Sawyer v. Whitley bars consider-
ation of claims of sentencing innocence which possibly concern the
accuracy of the balance between mitigating and aggravating factors.
This preclusion is demonstrated by the Court's explicit rejection of
a sentencing innocence definition that would extend beyond consid-
eration of the elements of the crime and statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances to the existence of additional mitigating evidence.'76
However, errors regarding the existence of mitigating evidence
conceivably could distort the weighing process, thus calling into
question the propriety of a death sentence.
Furthermore, by limiting its review to a defendant's eligibility
not binding upon the court."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 1985) (the 'jury
shall render an advisory sentence to the court"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e)
(West Supp. 1992) ("The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after
considering the jury's recommendation.").
172. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (Michie Supp. 1991) ("The jury shall impose a
sentence of death if it [finds] that: (1) Aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reason-
able doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all
mitigating circumstances , and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of
death ") (emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988) ("[The trier
of fact shall impose a sentence of death if [it] concludes that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.") (emphasis added).
173. Sondheimer, supra note 169, at 409.
174. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Anderson 1993):
If one or more aggravating circumstances is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the court, trial jury, or panel of three judges
shall consider, and weigh against the aggravating circumstances the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and background of the
offender, and
(7) [a]ny other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the
offender should be sentenced to death.
Id. (emphasis added).
175. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
176. Id. at 2522.
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for the death penalty, the Court disregards both the purposes under-
lying the state weighing requirements and the Eighth Amendment
principle of individualized sentencing in capital cases. These statu-
tory weighing provisions acknowledge that the process of weighing
does not consist merely of "tallying" aggravating and mitigating
factors for some type of numerical comparison; rather, the process
is designed to determine whether the proper sentence, in light of
all circumstances pertaining to the individual case, is life imprison-
ment or death. 77 Therefore, the accuracy of the weighing process
relies on the consideration of all evidence, both aggravating and
mitigating, which could bear on the application of the death penal-
ty to a particular individual.""
In sum, if critical mitigating evidence is not heard by the sen-
tencing body, then the weighing process will likely be skewed in
favor of the aggravating circumstances.'79 This imbalance could
177. ALA. CODE §13 A-5-48 (1982); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 68
(West Supp. 1993) (requirng the weighing process to be more than "mere tallying", to
include an overall consideration of the individual case). State case law supports such
statutory provisions regarding the weighing process:
In [the death penalty] context, the word 'weighing' is a metaphor for a process
which by nature is incapable of precise description. The word connotes a men-
tal balancing process, but certainly not one which calls for a mere mechanical
counting of factors on each side of the imaginary 'scale', or the arbitrary as-
signment of 'weights' to any of them. Each juror is free to assign whatever
moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all of the vanous
factors he is permitted to consider Thus the jury, by weighing the van-
ous factors, simply determines under the relevant evidence which penalty is
appropriate in the particular case.
Sundby, supra note 118, at 1198 n.174 (quoting from People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516,
532-534 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (emphasis added) (alter-
ations in original).
178. Further complicating the issue of actual innocence and the proper application of the
death penalty in weighing states are statutory provisions which control a sentencing au-
thority through unanimity and standard of proof requirements. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1993) (requiring the jury to "unanimously find[], by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that the death penalty is appropriate). The likelihood
that the onussion of critical mitigating evidence would alter the jury's ultimate sentencing
determination increases under either of these heightened standards. Still, the Court's new
standard bars defaulted or repetitive claims which raise such issues.
179. A number of courts have voiced this concern, anticipating that the weighing pro-
cess will be infected by the inclusion of invalid or unconstitutional aggravating factors
into the process. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2119 (1992) ("In a weigh-
ing State there is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an 'invalid'
aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.");
see also Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1339 (1992) ("A[n invalid] aggravating factor
used in the weighing process creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as
more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be "). Therefore, it
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result in an inappropriate sentence of death, resulting in the funda-
mental miscamage of justice which habeas corpus review is de-
signed to prevent. Consequently, the Sawyer v. Whitley standard
should not be applied in weighing states to claims of errors in the
presentation and evaluation of mitigation evidence because such
errors would obstruct the statutory weighing process and result in
inappropriate death sentences.
2. The Non-Weighing States
Application of the eligibility standard to non-weighing states
also presents a number of statutory problems, raising constitutional
concerns similar to those identified in weighing states.
In non-weighing states, whether the death penalty can or will
be imposed is generally a function of the following statutory three-
step formula, requiring: (1) conviction of a capital crime; (2) the
finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (3)
consideration of any statutory mitigating circumstance. 8 °  Al-
though these statutes do not require that the sentencer weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they do require that the
sentencer consider any nutigation evidence relevant to the ultimate
life or death decision before determining the appropriate sen-
tence.'
Again, Sawyer v. Whitley thwarts this third statutory element.
Although the term "consideration" is less instructive to the
sentencer, nevertheless, it still constitutes a statutory mandate under
the non-weighing sentencing schemes.' This mandate is not lim-
seems dangerous to adopt a sentencing innocence standard which ignores mitigation-related
errors because, like aggravation-related errors, these errors also undermine the accuracy of
the weighing process.
180. The sentencing scheme involved in Sawyer was such a non-weighing variety. See
LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN., art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1993) ("A sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances,
determines that the sentence of death should be imposed.") (emphasis added); accord GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1990) ("In all cases of offenses for which the death
penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, any mitigating or aggravat-
ing circumstances otherwise authorized by law ") (emphasis added); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 532.025(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1992) (same).
181. Sondheimer, supra note 169, at 410; See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-
l(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) ("The court [or jury] shall consider, any aggravating
and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty.")
(emphasis added).
182. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (stating that the
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ited to the threshold Eighth Amendment inquiry of whether a de-
fendant can, or is eligible to receive a penalty of death; rather, it
addresses the ultimate question of whether he deserves to die. As
with the capital statutes of weighing states it is this mandate which
the Sawyer sentencing innocence standard ignores.
In both weighing and non-weighing sentencing schemes, the
finding of statutory aggravating circumstances is but a prelimnary
step to the final decision: Is death the appropriate sentence for the
particular defendant involved? The Sawyer majority's focus on
eligibility wrongly suggests that any defendant who is eligible to
receive the death penalty is also deserving of its imposition.'
This rmsconstrues the relationship between aggravating circum-
stances and the appropriateness of a death sentence.
An accurate sentence can be determined only if the sentencer is
provided a complete profile of the defendant's circumstances. As
the defendant argued in Sawyer, "[o]nly after [the] presentation of
mitigating evidence can a jury properly assess an offender's moral
culpability and determine whether one who is eligible to die is also
deserving of execution."'" Any error resulting in the omission of
substantial mitigating evidence would result in an incomplete, and
therefore inaccurate, sentencing profile. Nevertheless, the Sawyer
standard precludes review of a defaulted or repetitive habeas peti-
tion when that petition is based on such a distorted sentencing
profile. Therefore, in either a weighing or non-weighing state, that
eligibility standard fails to protect a defendant who is actually
innocent of his sentence from a miscarriage of justice.
sentencer "shall consider any mitigating circumstances") (emphasis added); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (same).
183.
The [majority's] definition of 'innocence of the death sentence' is like the
[mandatory death-sentence regime invalidated in] Roberts: it focuses solely
on whether the defendant is in a class eligible for the death penalty and disre-
gards the equally important question of whether 'death is the appropriate pun-
ishment in [the defendant's] specific case."'
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2535 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting portions from Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1976) (third alteration in
original).
184. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Sawyer (No. 91-6382).
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B. Death Eligibility, State Capital Sentencing Schemes and
Sentencing Errors: A Return to the Difficult
Case of Mitigation
An inquiry into the extent of capital sentencing errors illus-
trates how the eligibility standard ignores mistakes which distort
state capital sentencing schemes. As previously discussed,"5 pre-
sentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital
trial is extremely difficult. The task is impeded further by the
flawed penalty process which sometimes prevents full presentation
of all relevant mitigating evidence, without which an accurate sen-
tencing profile cannot be developed. The following discussion
surveys the scope and consequences of these mitigation-related
errors to underscore the problems presented by an eligibility stan-
dard for sentencing innocence.
The omission of probative mitigation evidence in death penalty
cases, which often can be traced to mistakes by the defendant's
counsel, cannot be corrected unless they are considered constitu-
16tionally egregious. These frequent mistakes reflect the abysmal
quality of legal representation afforded to defendants"'7 at all
stages of the capital trial. Poor representation at the sentencing
stage is even more problematic than at the guilt-determination stage
because of the complex and subtle questions presented by the
various aggravating and mitigating circumstances.' These issues
underscore the need for competent counsel at the sentencing phase.
Numerous studies have documented variables that affect the
quality of counsel at the sentencing stage, particularly where indi-
gent representation is involved, including: lack of experience or
training, 8 9  inadequate" or non-existent 9' standards for ap-
185. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
186. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a stringent
standard for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel under which a defendant must
show that his counsel's deficient performance so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result).
187. Shredding the Net, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990. For an example of such abysmal
representation, see Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unprepared Lawyer Cited, A.B.A. J., February
1991, at 14 (discussing representation of a black defendant by a lawyer, a Ku Klux Klan
member, who slept instead of preparing for his client's capital trial).
188. Strasser, supra note 132, at 13; see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 11.8.6, cmt.
(1989) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (discussing the "different form of advocacy" required at
the death penalty sentencing stage).
189. See Marcia Coyle et al., supra note 107, at 2-3 (discussing absence of training in
capital defense in the southern states).
190. Id. at 3 (noting statutory requirement in Alabama and Louisiana of five years
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pointment,' 9 unrealistic statutory compensation caps, 193 and the
lack of attorneys willing to accept death penalty cases." These
factors undermine the quality of representation and result in the
propagation of mitigation-related errors. Therefore, it seems perilous
for the Court to limit opportunities to correct mitigation-related
errors when it has not taken appropriate steps to foreclose their
occurrence.
In sum, the probability and frequency of errors, which under-
mine the presentation and evaluation of mitigating evidence at the
sentencing phase, cast doubt on the effectiveness of state capital
sentencing schemes. These mistakes skew the balancing of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors in weighing states and inhibit full
consideration of these counteracting factors in non-weighing states.
The eligibility standard for sentencing innocence outlined in Sawyer
criminal law experience for an attorney to be appointed counsel in death penalty cases).
However, despite the statutory minimum, this requirement is disregarded frequently by trial
judges and violations are viewed on appeal as harmless error. Id. at 2.
191. See id. at 4 (noting that Florida, Mississippi and Texas lack any statewide stan-
dards for the appointment of counsel in death penalty cases).
192. But see GUIDELINES, supra note 188, at Guideline 5.1 (proposing mimmum levels
of expertise for attorneys representing capital defendants at trial, on appeal, and during
postconviction review). These eligibility standards reflect seven quality control criteria to
be used in the selection of counsel: (1) license to practice in the jurisdiction; (2) experi-
ence in criminal defense; (3) experience in felony practice including murder and other
capital crimes defenses; (4) experience with the procedure of the criminal courts of the
requisite jurisdiction; (5) familiarity with the type of evidence utilized in the requisite
court system; (6) continuous training in capital litigation; and (7) demonstrated commit-
ment to quality representation. Id.
193. See id., ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 61-62 (noting that many states pay virtually
nothing for defense representation in capital cases); Fred Strasser, $1,000 Fee Cap Makes
Death Row's 'Justice' A Bargain for the State, NAT'L L. J., June 11, 1990, at 5 (discuss-
mg Mississippi's statutory fee limit on defense representation in capital cases which, in
some cases, amounted to less than five dollars an hour); GUIDELINES, supra note 188,
Guideline 10.1, cmt. (criticizing 1985 Virginia compensation scheme under which counsel,
in some cases, were paid an average wage of $1 an hour). The ABA has responded to
the problem of "token" compensation for capital counsel by proposing to require a reason-
able hourly rate of compensation, full reimbursement for incidental expenses, and periodic
billing payments during the course of representation. Id. In addition, state courts have
increasingly been forced to address statutory fee caps. See, e.g., Arnold v. Kemp, 813
S.W. 2d 770, 775 (Ark. 1991) (noting that a statutory fee cap imposed on court-appointed
attorney was excesstve, constituting a "taking" of property by providing only token com-
pensation of $1,000).
194. See Linda Williams, Death-Row Inmates Often Lack Help for Appeals, But Few
Lawyers Want to Do Distasteful Work, WALL ST. J., August 27, 1987 § 2, at 48 (noting
that "[i]n a nation with a glut of lawyers, there is a severe shortage of those willing to
take capital-crime cases", a shortage the author attributes to political considerations and
the lack of financial incentives); see also ROBBINS, supra note 11, at 62-64 (discussing
the impact of compensation limits on the availability of defense counsel).
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v. Whitley fails to remedy either sentencing distortion.
VI. POST-SAWYER IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTUAL SENTENCING
INNOCENCE: A BLEAK FUTURE
Although a constitutionally-consistent standard for capital sen-
tencing innocence does exist-permitting federal habeas review of
defaulted, successive or abusive claims when those claims are
based on mitigation-related errors which probably resulted in an
inappropriate sentencing outcome' 95-the Sawyer v. Whitley eligi-
bility standard has already been embraced, and even extended, by a
number of federal district and circuit courts.19 ' Despite the Eighth
Amendment implications of the eligibility standard, a number of
courts do seem willing to use that standard to foreclose one of the
last remaining routes available to a capital defendant seeking feder-
al habeas review
Significantly, some federal circuit courts have extended the
eligibility standard to errors unrelated to the mitigation phase."9
The Sawyer eligibility standard has been extended beyond sentenc-
ing innocence claims to encompass claims arising from the guilt-
determination context.' In fact, some significant extensions of
195. See Murray v. Carrier, '477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (stating that given "a constitu-
tional violation [which] has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default") (emphasis added); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986) (same); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2531-33 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurnng in judgment) (noting that the Court has frequently confirmed this standard).
196. See Blair v. Armontrout, 976 F.2d 1130, 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
Sawyer eligibility standard to reject successive habeas claims which were based on defense
counsel errors and abusive claims based on improper prosecutonal peremptory challenges),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2357 (1993); see also Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.)
(employing Sawyer standard to refuse review of a successive claim that a state aggravat-
ing factor was unconstitutional because even assuming such statutory unconstitutionality,
the petitioner would not be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no rea-
sonable juror would find him eligible for the death penalty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 27
(1992); Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1992) (invoking Sawyer eligi-
bility standard to dismiss procedurally barred habeas claim wluch was based on error in
the presentation of additional mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2445 (1993);
Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Sawyer standard to dismiss
successive claim based on failure of counsel to discover critical mitigating evidence con-
cerning petitioner's mental disease), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1301 (1993). For examples of
extensions of the Sawyer standard, see infra notes 197-98.
197. See, e.g., McCoy v. Lockhart, 969 F.2d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Sawyer
eligibility standard to refuse rape conviction challenge based on error of defendant's legal
counsel whose mistake resulted in the omission of potentially exculpatory evidence), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 3056 (1993).
198. See id. at 651 ("Although the new [eligibility] standard required by Sawyer was
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the Sawyer test have occurred in circuits which once criticized its
narrow scope.'99
Thus, a survey of post-Sawyer actual innocence cases reveals
that the eligibility standard has rapidly infiltrated the federal juris-
prudential system without being challenged for its potential impact
on state capital sentencing schemes. Therefore, any error which
affects the accuracy of a defendant's sentencing profile, by distort-
ing either the weighing or considering of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances, will likely go without remedy. If the post-Saw-
yer cases are any indication of what the future holds for defaulted
or repetitive habeas petitions, then future claims of actual sentenc-
ing innocence face dismal prospects for success.
CONCLUSION
The death eligibility standard pronounced in Sawyer v. Whitley
has effectively closed one of the last remaining routes through
which capital defendants can obtain federal review of defaulted or
repetitive habeas corpus petitions based on claims of actual inno-
cence of the sentence. The standard fails to address the critical
inquiry in any sentencing innocence claim: Would the petitioner
have been sentenced to death if constitutional error had, not under-
mined the accuracy of his individualized sentencing profile? In
other words, is the penalty of death appropriate in the particular
case?
In framing the issue of sentencing innocence in terms of a
petitioner's "death eligibility", the Supreme Court has, in effect,
answered the wrong question. Under traditional capital punishment
jurisprudence, the focus is not on whether the defendant is eligible
to receive the penalty of death, but whether the penalty should be
imposed on him. This concern is most pressing precisely when
constitutional errors inhibit the full presentation and evaluation of
mitigating evidence during the sentencing hearing of a capital trial.
announced in the context of a challenge to a death sentence, rather than a challenge to a
conviction, we conclude that the new standard applies equally to challenges to a convic-
tion, not just challenges to a death sentence."); Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d 376, 382 (8th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting a procedurally defaulted innocence claim based on exculpatory evi-
dence improperly suppressed at trial because the petitioner had not demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that but for the alleged errors, no reasonable juror would have
convicted him), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1820 (1993).
199. See, e.g., McCoy, 969 F.2d at 651 (discussing cases drawn from 'circuits which had
once refused to employ death eligibility as the standard for actual sentencing innocence).
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Therefore, it begs the question to limit the innocence inquiry to
errors affecting a petitioner's eligibility for death as opposed to
errors affecting the subjective appropriateness of the sentence. The
Sawyer v. Whitley eligibility standard not only disregards this fun-
damental constitutional distinction but also disregards variations in
state capital sentencing schemes which are designed to refine the
life or death decision-making process.
By asking the wrong question, the Rehnquist Court has, in the
form of the Sawyer v. Whitley eligibility standard, provided the
wrong answer to the confusion over actual innocence of the sen-
tence. By asking the wrong question, the Rehnquist Court has
ignored constitutional errors which distort the appropriate sentenc-
ing outcome. By asking the wrong question, the Rehnquist Court
has won another battle in its war against habeas corpus thus dnv-
ing another nail into the coffin of state capital defendants.
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